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ABSTRACT 
This project examines the relationship between capital markets and political 
institutions.  I use Australia and Canada as case studies.  The main hypothesis I advance 
is that the framework of securities regulation must “fit” into a society’s broader 
institutional context.  A regulatory system that is not well adapted to its institutional 
surroundings risks becoming implausible.  I also argue that one of the key conditions for 
capital markets to be regulated in a centralized way is the presence of institutions that 
allow national policy makers to overcome resistance from regional authorities.  This 
condition is present in Australia, but not in Canada.  Other developments in Australia, 
such as large-scale corporate scandals, facilitated the centralization of capital markets 
regulation.   
Political institutions descended from the British Westminster Parliamentary 
system govern both Australia and Canada.  However, the framework through which each 
country regulates capital markets presents a sharp contrast: while Australia has a single 
national regulatory agency, in Canada each province retains jurisdiction over securities 
regulation.  Analysis of this contrast provides evidence to support this project’s 
hypotheses. 
Regulating capital markets can have important effects on a society’s financial and 
economic development.  Political authorities, whether national or regional, are generally 
keen to exercise this power in order to prevent market failures that can impede economic 
development and frustrate the implementation of a government’s economic agenda.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This project analyzes the relationship between securities regulation and political 
institutions.  The case studies of Australia and Canada provide evidence to support this 
project’s conclusions.  The regulatory framework is the dependent variable in this 
exercise.  Institutional context is the primary independent variable.  This project has 
seven chapters.  The introductory chapter does four things.  First, it touches on the 
importance on market efficiency.  Second, it emphasizes the need for trust and stability in 
an economic system.  Third, it argues that a regulatory framework must be compatible 
with a society’s institutions.  Fourth, it looks at the case studies employed in this project.  
Finally, Chapter 1 provides a project outline. 
1.1 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY 
The framework used to regulate a capital market has a direct impact on that 
market’s efficiency.  An effective regulatory framework can promote increased 
investment, can generate increased capital inflows, and strengthen investor confidence.  
An ineffective regulatory framework can encourage capital flight, weaken investor 
confidence, and result in declining investment levels.   
1.2 THE NEED FOR TRUST IN CAPITAL MARKETS   
In order to function efficiently, an economic system requires a degree of trust 
among its participants.  Trust among the participants in economic transactions is greatly 
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enhanced by laws that uphold the sanctity of contracts.  These laws, while varying from 
state to state, are often a reflection of a society’s norms. 
Capital markets are an integral part of any capitalist system.  Private sector 
economic activity depends on sound capital markets.  Capital markets also require a 
stable institutional and judicial framework to function effectively.  The political 
institutions that govern a society largely shape this framework.  The regulatory policies 
implemented by public authorities steer the system. 
1.3. REGULATION AND INSTITUTIONS 
This project argues that any framework employed to regulate capital markets must 
be compatible with the political institutions that govern a society.  Changes to the 
framework of capital markets regulation can only work if the proposed changes allow the 
regulatory system to remain “in sync” with broader institutional arrangements.  This 
project does not attempt to propose which security regulatory system is best.  Rather, this 
project will develop its conclusions by explaining why the regulatory systems of Australia 
and Canada differ.   
1.4. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA AS CASE STUDIES 
This study uses a comparison of securities regulation in Australia and Canada to 
lend support to its arguments.  While both countries have similar political institutions, the 
regulation of capital markets in each country is quite different: in Australia, securities 
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regulation is in the hands of a single national regulatory agency.  In Canada, securities 
regulation is in under provincial jurisdiction. 1 
This divergence can be understood through both normative and positive 
perspectives.  From a normative standpoint, proponents of national regulatory agencies 
for capital markets argue that this system brings consistency, lower costs, and high 
standards to securities regulation.2  On the other hand, proponents of allowing regional 
authorities to retain control over securities regulation argue that this framework allows 
for healthy competition3 and protection of regional political and economic rights.4 
From a positive perspective, a centralized regulatory system can be implemented 
only if national political authorities wield powers that local authorities are unable or 
unwilling to resist.5  In turn, powerful regional authorities, conscious of their 
prerogatives, are able to preserve their control over capital markets regulation and resist 
interference from national authorities. 
Regulatory differences between the two countries are perhaps rendered more 
intriguing by that fact that the Australian and Canadian constitutions share some 
fundamental similarities: 6 
                                                 
1 David Mitchell, 2003, “Evaluation of Canadian Securities Regulation: Should Canada Adopt the 
Australian ‘One-Stop’ Regulatory Approach?,” Journal of Financial Crime, p. 382. 
2 Ibid., p. 382. 
3 Fazil Mihlar, 2003, “What our securities markets don’t need: a national regulator,” Financial Post, July 4, 
FP11. 
4 David Mitchell, 2003, “Evaluation of Canadian Securities Regulation: Should Canada Adopt the 
Australian ‘One-Stop’ Regulatory Approach?,” Journal of Financial Crime, p. 386. 
5 Ibid., p. 385. 
6 George Goulet, 1991, A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Aspects of Securities Regulation in 
Canada and Australia, p. 51. 
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1)  A federal system of government.  The national government shares political    
power with regional governments.  Regional authorities have exclusive 
jurisdiction over important areas of policy-making. 
2)  A bi-cameral central parliament.  The parliament of both countries is 
composed of a lower chamber (the House of Commons) and an upper chamber 
(the Senate).     
3)  A system of responsible government.  The executive branch of 
government is answerable to parliament in both countries. 
4)  An independent supreme court is the final arbiter of the constitution and 
the constitutional validity of laws.  George Goulet notes that in Australia the 
Constitution itself established the High Court.  In Canada, the Constitution 
empowered Parliament to establish the Supreme Court.  “The High Court is 
constitutionally entrenched.  The Supreme Court is a creature of a federal statute, 
but may now be constitutionally entrenched.”7  
5)  The supremacy of the constitution.  The constitution provides the legal 
basis for the division of jurisdictional policy-making prerogatives between the 
various levels of government.  
1.5. PROJECT OUTLINE 
The institutions and norms mentioned above have a direct impact on capital 
markets and securities regulation.  Goulet defines securities regulation as “that body of 
laws, regulations, policies and procedures which governs the securities market and 
                                                 
7 George Goulet, 1991, A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Aspects of Securities Regulation in 
Canada and Australia, Footnote 34. 
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participants in that market, including securities issuers, traders and investors, investment 
dealers and underwriters, securities salesmen and stock exchanges.”8 
This project proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews current literature relevant to 
economic regulation.  Chapter 3 analyzes the regulation of capital markets in the context 
of public policy.  Chapter 4 looks at the effect of federalism on capital markets 
regulation.  Chapter 5 reviews Australia’s experience and analyzes the implications we 
can draw from this case study.  Chapter 6 carries out a similar exercise using Canada as a 
case study.  The evidence provided by the experience of Australia and Canada in the field 
of securities regulation supports this project’s key finding.  Finally, Chapter 7 analyzes 
the lessons drawn from the two case studies and offers concluding remarks.   
An effective regulatory system can help increase the efficiency of financial 
markets.  This project reaches the conclusion that a regulatory system must fit into 
broader institutional conditions in order to be effective.   
                                                 
8 George Goulet, 1991, A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Aspects of Securities Regulation in 
Canada and Australia, p. 7.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2 attempts to provide a comprehensive summary of current theories 
dealing with the concept of regulation, the dependent variable of this project.  This 
summary establishes a theoretical context to the general conclusions of this project.  
Chapter 2 surveys the main regulatory themes studied by academics; analyzes the 
literature’s predictions on future developments in the field of financial regulation; and 
takes a look at current regulatory debates in Canada. 
2.1. DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATORY THEORY 
Current socio-economic trends have had a considerable impact on theories of 
governmental regulation.  Such trends include: globalization, re-assessment of the 
effectiveness of policy-making models, recent scandals in the field of corporate 
governance, and the growing role played by multi-lateral organizations (e.g., the 
European Union) in the field of public policy-making.  These trends are changing the 
environment in which regulatory agencies operate.  Policy makers have sought to 
improve regulatory regimes by changing the dynamics of governments’ interaction with 
interest groups.  Regulation theorists have become cognizant of the fact that policy-
making must remain one step ahead of contextual change.  Some theorists (e.g., Graham 
Wilson) study the ability of policy makers to “import” regulatory practices from other 
countries and jurisdictions.  Other theorists (e.g., Tony Porter, David Vogel, etc.) analyze 
the impact of institutions and culture on the policy-making process. 
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2.2. THEMES IN THE LITERATURE ON “REGULATION” 
The three main themes that appear (at some level) as common denominators in 
most of the works I have researched are: (1) the effect of institutional structures, (2) the 
effect of social structures, and (3) the impact of regulatory innovation.  While these three 
concepts often provide a common thread to the literature, I shall review other relevant 
themes, such as “culture” or “legitimacy.” 
2.2.1. Regulatory Policy and Institutions 
Institutions are the vehicle through which regulatory policy is implemented.  A 
number of academics have studied the relationship between institutional design and 
public policy-making.  Beryl Radin and Joan Price Boase have written extensively on the 
relationship between federalist political structures and public policy-making in both the 
United States and Canada.  They state that public policy should be analyzed in the 
context of relationships prevalent within the political structure, political culture, and 
public administration.9  They write that, in Canada, the fragmentation of political power 
has generated “the need for high-level political involvement in the pursuit of nationwide 
re-distributive policy-making.”10   
These two authors make the case that federalism is generally a conservative force 
in Canada – the extensive division of powers dampens policy change.  This is largely the 
result of two factors: (a) the executive power of provincial governments and (b) Quebec’s 
                                                 
9 Beryl Radin and Joan Price Boase, 2000, “Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United 
States and Canada,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, p. 67. 
10 Ibid., p. 67. 
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insistence on fully exercising its jurisdictional prerogatives.11  However, Donald Smiley 
argues that while the federalist system sometimes stands in the way of rational policy-
making, the Canadian polity has generally been able to design effective public policy.12 
Tony Porter has studied international financial regulation from a constructivist 
perspective.  Constructivist approaches “focus on the norms and other shared 
understandings between actors...”13 These norms contribute to the strength of institutions.  
According to constructivist theory, institutions and beliefs can shape actors’ perceptions 
of their own interests.14  Porter defines a constructivist viewpoint: 
A constructivist perspective suggests that institutions will be heavily 
shaped by a developmental trajectory that can be traced back through the 
institution’s history, rather than by a constantly changeable configuration 
of national interests.15 
Politics is present in the international financial regulatory regime.  At the same 
time, the institutional character of the regime largely shapes its politics.16  The political 
power present in the international regime for financial regulation “works through the 
structure of the international institutions which have been developed.”17  In turn, these 
institutions and the regime they are part of impact political dynamics by “bequeathing an 
idiosyncratic institutional structure with policy-relevant effects…”18 Tony Porter 
contrasts the constructivist approach to the “rationalist” school of thought.  Rationalist 
                                                 
11 Beryl Radin and Joan Price Boase, 2000, “Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United 
States and Canada,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, p. 67. 
12 Ibid., pp. 66-67.  Cites Donald Smiley, 1987, The Federal Condition in Canada, p. 22. 
13 Tony Porter, 2002, “Politics, Institutions, Constructivism, and the Emerging International Regime for 
Financial Regulation,” The Review of Policy Research, p. 55. 
14 Ibid., p. 57. 
15 Ibid., p. 58. 
16 Ibid., p. 70. 
17 Ibid., p. 72. 
18 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
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approaches assume that actors maximize their interests through implicit cost-benefit 
calculations.19 
2.2.2. Regulation and Culture 
Culture helps shape social structures.  These social structures include institutions, 
norms, and traditions.  Regulatory action must operate within the bounds set by these 
structures.  Innovative regulatory policies have a much greater chance of success if 
existing social structures are able to absorb policy changes.  Efforts “to adopt new styles 
of regulation remain highly constrained by the familiar variables of institutions, interest 
group systems, and culture.”20 
Steven Kelman and David Vogel stress the importance of “culture” when 
explaining differences in regulatory styles between countries.21  Graham Wilson writes 
the following about authors such as David Vogel: 
… [T]hey do not treat culture as some sort of exogenously generated 
influence but explain it in terms of the history of the relationship between 
social classes and the state over an extended historical period.22   
2.2.3. Regulatory “Styles” and Approaches 
The nature of regulatory techniques can determine the level of regulatory 
effectiveness.  In his paper “Changing Regulatory Systems,” Graham Wilson discusses 
the development of different regulatory approaches in developed countries.  He writes:   
                                                 
19 Tony Porter, 2002, “Politics, Institutions, Constructivism, and the Emerging International Regime for 
Financial Regulation,” The Review of Policy Research, pp. 75-76. 
20 Graham Wilson, 2003, “Changing Regulatory Systems,” p. 28. 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 Graham Wilson, 2003, “Policy Transfer Versus Varieties of Capitalism in Environmental Policy,” p. 8.  
 10 
Studies of regulatory systems have … tended to emphasize the importance 
of long enduring factors that promote considerable stability in regulatory 
styles that can differ considerably from one country to another.23   
Graham Wilson’s paper focuses on a comparison of the United Kingdom’s 
traditionally “consensual” regulatory style and the United States’ traditionally 
“confrontational” regulatory system.  This traditional contrast can be explained by the 
different historical developments of North American and European societies.  In the 
USA, large-scale business pre-dated the appearance of large-scale government.  In 
Europe (and Japan), the opposite happened.24  Certain authors posit that the traditional 
contrast in regulatory styles between Europe and the USA is due to different legal 
cultures.25  The idiosyncratic character of institutions can also help account for 
differences in regulatory styles.26  “Indeed… the purpose of institutional design is often 
to lock policies into place by making change difficult, even impossible.”27 
Graham Wilson identifies some implications from existing analysis of regulatory 
structures around the world: (1) institutions matter, (2) interest group structures count, 
and (3) culture counts.  This means longstanding variables such as institutions, interest 
group systems, and culture constrain attempts to adopt new styles of regulation.28  
Techniques employed in banking regulation provide useful insight into public 
policy-making in the field of financial services.  There are two general theories of 
banking regulation: (1) the “public interest” approach “suggests that regulatory measures 
                                                 
23 Graham Wilson, 2003, “Changing Regulatory Systems,” p. 4. 
24 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
25 Ibid., p. 7. 
26 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
27 Ibid., p. 9. 
28 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
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are designed to protect against market failures, such as natural monopoly, imperfect 
information, and externalities”;29 (2) the “capture” or “self-interest” theory of regulation 
“suggests that interest groups seek regulation primarily for the benefits it produces for 
them.”30  Robert Litan outlines two paradigms in the field of banking regulation.  The 
first paradigm is the “prevention-safety net” paradigm, designed to prevent bank failures.  
This paradigm is also designed to protect depositors and creditors.  Litan’s second 
paradigm is the “competition-containment” paradigm, which calls for allowing banks to 
compete with non-banks.  This paradigm calls for isolating problems that may arise.31  
Some recent academic studies emphasize the value of obtaining voluntary 
compliance from regulated entities.  Magali Delmas and Ann Terlaak have discussed the 
effectiveness of Negotiated Agreements (NA) in the context of attempts to obtain 
“voluntary compliance.”  They argue that NAs can be implemented “when regulators are 
able to commit credibly to the objectives of NAs.”32  The credibility of regulatory 
agencies can suffer if they operate in an institutional environment in which power is 
fragmented.  In such an environment, many competing actors might attempt to play 
conflicting roles.33   
                                                 
29 Jill Hendrickson and Mark Nichols, 2001, “How Does Regulation Affect the Risk Taking of Banks?  A 
U.S. and Canadian Perspective,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, p. 60.  Cites Robert Litan and 
William Nordhaus, 1983, Reforming Federal Regulation. 
30 Ibid., p. 60.  Cites Sam Peltzman, 1976, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law 
and Economics, and George Stilger, 1971, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science.   
31 Ibid., p. 64.  Cites Robert Litan, 1997,  “Institutions and Policies for Maintaining Financial Stability,”  
Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy.   
32 Magali Delmas and AnnTerlaak, 2000, “Regulatory Commitment to Negotiated Agreements: Evidence 
from the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and France,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 
p. 5.  
33 Ibid., p. 5.  
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Institutional theory shows that a country’s institutional structures condition 
regulatory options.  These structures shape the authorities’ ability to commit credibly to 
regulatory policies.34  The potential benefits derived from establishing NAs can be 
outweighed by costs if the NAs “are implemented in an institutional setting that limits the 
agreements’ stability.”35  The presence of a culture of “consensual policy-making” can 
enhance institutional stability.36  
Pinaki Bose has written about “anticipatory compliance” in the context of what 
we might call “non-confrontational” enforcement.  A firm’s ability to anticipate potential 
compliance problems before they arise can greatly reduce regulatory problems.  
Anticipatory compliance requires increased communication and cooperation between 
regulators and those regulated.  This regulatory technique can result in higher levels of 
compliance at “lower monitoring frequencies.”37  Presumably, anticipatory compliance 
could minimize regulatory costs. 
Regulatory “forbearance” is another type of “non-confrontational” regulatory 
technique.  We can define “forbearance,” in a regulatory context, as the willingness of 
regulators to eschew confrontation in favour of collaboration.  This approach might 
include reducing enforcement actions, relying on positive rather than negative 
reinforcement.  Gary Woller and Neil Brady believe that “regulatory forbearance” can be 
an effective tool when used judiciously.  However, if it becomes routine it can result in 
                                                 
34 Magali Delmas and AnnTerlaak, 2000, “Regulatory Commitment to Negotiated Agreements: Evidence 
from the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and France,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 
p. 6. 
35 Ibid., p. 24. 
36 Ibid., p. 24. 
37 Pinaki Bose, 1995, “Anticipatory Compliance and Effective Regulatory Activity,” International Review 
of Law and Economics, p. 1. 
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ineffective regulation.38  Addressing a regulatory technique of growing popularity in 
governmental circles, Nutavoot Pongsiri has analyzed the relationship between regulation 
and public-private partnerships.39   
2.2.4. Regulatory Policy “Transfers” 
A “policy transfer” refers to the ability of a regulatory entity to adopt the policy- 
making techniques being used by agencies in separate jurisdictions.  In his paper “Policy 
Transfer Versus Varieties of Capitalism in Environmental Policy,” Graham Wilson 
outlines three main causes of recent “policy transfers” across jurisdictions: (1) the 
demand for new ideas; (2) globalization; and (3) the growth in the importance of 
international networks and organizations.40  Wilson looks at two case studies.  First, 
Wilson analyzes the State of Wisconsin’s new initiatives in the field of environmental 
regulation in the 1990s.  Second, Wilson examines the Labour government’s 
environmental policy reform in the late 1990s in the United Kingdom.   
In both cases, efforts to fundamentally change environmental policy failed.  
Efforts to import alternatives to traditional regulation into Britain and the United States 
failed because they attempted to replicate a specific set of policies, but could not adopt 
the entire institutional setting that supports those policies.41  Nevertheless, in cases where 
policy transfers do not succeed, the attempt to import new methods can still have a 
                                                 
38 Gary Woller and Neil Brady, 1995, “An Ethical Defence of Regulatory Forbearance,” International 
Journal of Public Administration, p. 851. 
39 Nutavoot Pongsiri, 2002, “Regulation and Public-Private Partnerships,” The International Journal of 
Public Sector Management, p. 487. 
40 Graham Wilson, 2003, “Policy Transfer Versus Varieties of Capitalism in Environmental Policy,” pp. 1-
4. 
41 Ibid., p. 32. 
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significant impact on policy-making.42  Wilson offers these concluding remarks in 
regards to policy transfers: 
“The fundamental problem that has afflicted the attempts to import 
alternatives to traditional regulation into Britain and the United States 
might be said to be that they attempt to borrow a specific set of policies 
but cannot import the entire set of practices, assumptions, attitudes and 
institutions that underpin them.”43 
2.2.5. Regulation and Information 
The quality and quantity of information available to regulators and those 
regulated can affect the results of regulatory policies.  Søren Winter and Peter May affirm 
that the availability of information can enhance compliance by enhancing awareness of 
rules.  Greater awareness can help develop a “sense of duty” among those regulated.  
Information, however, does not directly influence compliance.  The authors also believe 
that interest groups play an important role in the “legitimization” of regulatory policies.44  
Interest groups are important vehicles for socialization.  They help shape their members’ 
view of regulatory entities. 
2.2.6.  Regulation and Compliance 
Compliance with regulatory policies will decline if policy makers rely only on 
enforcement methods.  Jon Sutinen and K. Kuperan have developed a theory of 
regulatory compliance that takes into account “moral obligation” and “social influence,” 
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in addition to the costs normally associated with law breaking.45  The authors conclude 
that the socialization of regulated entities plays a large role in ensuring compliance with 
regulations.  Those regulated will probably not perceive arbitrary policies as legitimate.  
Such policies will therefore not elicit high levels of compliance.46  This theory implies 
that institutional design can play an important role in regulation.  As a corollary, 
regulatory bodies should be “designed” in a way that will enhance their legitimacy in the 
eyes of others.47  Legitimacy can encourage greater voluntary compliance.  Voluntary 
compliance, in turn, can reduce costs to all parties involved. 
2.3. LITERATURE’S DISCUSSION OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS  
Some regulatory theorists have attempted to outline the future direction of 
regulatory policy.  In his paper “Changing Regulatory Systems,” Graham Wilson has 
identified three broad possible changes in regulatory techniques around the world: (1) 
convergence, with governments attempting to learn from each other and harmonize their 
rules; (2) a new model for all; and (3) the persistence of national differences.  
Giandomenico Majone analyzes the possible effect of dismantling of national barriers on 
regulatory policy.  
2.3.1. Market Integration 
Giandomenico Majone discusses the issue of “market integration” in the context 
of new regulatory trends.  Integration can be negative or positive.  “Negative integration 
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denotes the removal of discrimination in national rules and policies that may impede the 
free movement of people, goods, service, and capital.”48  On the other hand, positive 
integration “entails the delegation to supranational institutions, or the joint exercise by 
the national authorities, of at least some regulatory powers.”49  In the European Union 
today we see the development of new regulatory concepts, such as “harmonization,” 
“mutual recognition,” and “regulatory federalism.”50 
Interestingly enough, Hugh Sherman et al. have concluded that a stringent 
regulatory environment can bring about increased internationalization of a firm’s 
operations.51  This might carry interesting implications for the relationship between 
regulatory public policy and “globalization.”  Could one actually re-enforce the other? 
2.4. DEBATES OVER SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA 
A number of commentators have increasingly called into question the 
effectiveness of Canada’s securities regulation structure.  The regulation of capital 
markets in Canada falls under provincial jurisdiction.  This is the result of prevailing 
interpretations of Canada’s constitution.  A 1932 decision of the Canadian Privy Council 
(Lymburn v. Mayland) “held that the provinces may constitutionally regulate securities 
markets by virtue of their authority to make law in relation to ‘property and civil rights in 
the province.’”52   
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49 Ibid., p. 311. 
50 Ibid., pp. 312-320. 
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52 Jeffrey MacIntosh, 1996, A National Securities Commission for Canada?, pp. 191-192. 
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Each province and territory in Canada has its own agency for securities 
regulation.  Such agencies are accountable only to provincial/territorial governments.  
There is no national regulatory agency, although provincial securities commissions 
coordinate their actions through the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).  This 
arrangement is unique among developed nations.  Partly as a result of this unique degree 
of decentralization, Canada’s current regulatory system is the subject of growing debate 
in business, government, and academic circles. 
2.4.1. Arguments in Favour of Centralizing Securities Regulation   
A number of lobby groups (e.g., the Investment Dealers Association of Canada)53 
have criticized the current regulatory system as being cumbersome, too complex, and 
inefficient.54  They favour the creation of a single national regulator that would 
harmonize securities laws across Canada.  Such a harmonization would make it easier for 
Canadian firms to raise capital, as investors would not have to simultaneously conform to 
different provincial laws.  According to this school of thought, the existence of one 
national securities regulator would also reduce firms’ administrative costs. 
Some analysts affirm that foreign investors have a negative perception of 
Canada’s “disparate” regulatory regime.55  They argue the present system puts Canada at 
a competitive disadvantage by discouraging investment and imposing high compliance 
                                                 
53 Fazil Mihlar, 2003, “What Our Securities Markets Don’t Need: A National Regulator,” Financial Post, 
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costs.56  The current system may work well for an issuer present only in one jurisdiction, 
but not for an issuer present in various.57 
Some limitations of the current system are: 58  
1)  Different applications of uniform rules.  Efforts to design uniform 
legislation can be frustrated by different application methods in different 
jurisdictions. 
2)  Differing regulations, rules, and policies.  The regional focus of each 
regulatory agency can lead it to enact regulations with local needs in mind.  
3)  Differing philosophical approaches.  The absence of a single national 
regulator allows each regulatory agency to adopt a peculiar philosophical 
approach to issues. 
4)  Audits are not coordinated.  The independent character of each securities 
commission renders coordination difficult. 
5)  Extensive regulatory overlap.  Lack of coordination can translate into 
regulatory overlap. 
2.4.2. Possible Ways of Centralizing Securities Regulation 
The present allocation of responsibility for securities regulation is a result of 
current interpretation of the Canadian Constitution.  Some constitutionally viable 
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procedures for the formation of a national securities commission might have the 
following characteristics: 59  
1)  Provincial adoption by reference of federal legislation.  In this case, each 
province would delegate its authority to a federal body.   
2)  Joint delegation of power to a common regulatory body by both provincial 
and federal governments.  This option could hold the advantage of increasing 
regulatory coordination, while retaining responsiveness to local needs. 
3)  Delegation of provincial authority to a national (but not federal) 
commission.  Such a commission would be independent from the federal 
government. 
4)  A national securities commission might strengthen Canada’s position in 
international negotiations.  On the other hand, it might lack transparency, 
responsiveness, and political accountability.60  In the past, provincial governments 
funded and collected income from the activities of provincial securities 
commissions.  The recent adoption of self-funding by the larger securities 
commissions (through registration fees, etc.) may eliminate some of the 
provinces’ concerns over loss of revenue.61 
2.4.3. Opposition to the Centralization of Securities Regulation  
Most provincial governments are opposed to proposals to create a single national 
securities regulator in Canada.  They argue that the present system fosters high regulatory 
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standards, as different securities commissions must compete with each other to attract 
financial industry players.62  Opponents of the centralization of securities regulation 
essentially believe that competition is as useful here as it is in other markets.  Those in 
favour of retaining the present regulatory system also posit that the creation of a single 
national monopoly regulator would bring higher costs.  A national regulator could also 
signify the establishment of a new layer of bureaucracy.63  In other words, they argue that 
monopoly regulation has the same disadvantages as monopoly elsewhere in the economy.  
Furthermore, a national regulator would likely mean the imposition of a “Central 
Canadian” perspective on the rest of the country.  The province of Quebec, in particular, 
is concerned about any type of reform that would infringe on its jurisdiction in the area of 
securities regulation.   
There is also debate in Canada over the roles played by specific individual 
securities commissions.  Commentators such as Philip Anisman are concerned that 
Canadian securities commissions have simultaneously exercised policy-making, 
investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.64  At the very least, this poses 
questions as to commissions’ impartiality in the adjudicative process, for they are 
currently able to act as both “prosecutor” and “judge” in any investigation. 
2.5. OBSERVATIONS ON REGULATORY THEORY 
Giandomenico Majone believes that “international diffusion of regulation as a 
distinct type of policy-making” accounts for the growing interest in regulatory studies.  
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Recent “theoretical advances in the comparative study of institutions” also help promote 
growing interest in regulation.65  New research “pays careful attention to institutional 
factors that affect both industry performance and the choice of policy tools.”66  This 
project will analyze such institutional factors as an independent variable.  I focus on the 
role played by political institutions in the field of capital market regulation.  Therefore, 
literature that studies the links between regulation and institutions is of great relevance to 
this project.   
Institutional constraints, however, are not the only exogenous factor affecting 
regulatory systems.  Current literature also looks at the relationship between regulatory 
procedures, on one hand, and international dynamics, culture, and psychological forces, 
on the other.   
I will attempt to incorporate the concepts reviewed in this chapter into its analysis 
of securities regulation in Australia and Canada.  Chapter 2 has presented the theoretical 
bases of proposals to reform financial and economic regulation.  Chapter 3 will analyze 
regulation in the context of public policy-making. 
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATION AS PUBLIC POLICY 
This chapter links financial regulation with the broader concept of public policy.  
Securities regulation is a form of public policy.  A basic understanding of public policy 
can provide useful insights into securities regulation.  Awareness of public policy goals 
can provide insight into efforts to enhance the efficiency of financial markets.  Chapter 3 
first offers a definition of the concept of public policy.  Second, it proceeds to discuss the 
market failure.  Finally, this chapter outlines the main objectives of securities regulation.   
3.1. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
David Weimer and Aidan Vining define public policies as the alternatives and 
strategies designed to promote public goals.  They define public goals as the values a 
society seeks to promote.67  Alternatives and strategies crafted in pursuit of public goals 
“should be consistent with available resources, including jurisdictional authority and 
controllable variables.”68  Public policy must use accurate information.  Public policy 
should be grounded in reality.  “More generally, the list of constraints [taken into 
consideration when carrying out policy analysis] should include any resources that are 
essential for either maintaining the status quo or implementing alternative policies.”69 
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The five basic approaches to policy analysis are:  (1) Formal Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, (2) Qualitative Cost-Benefit Analysis, (3) Modified Cost-Benefit Analysis, (4) 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, and (5) Multi-Goal Policy Analysis. 
From a public policy perspective, government must regulate capital markets in 
order to counter market inefficiencies.  “If theory and evidence suggest market failure in 
an operational market, there is a prima facie case for government intervention.”70  
According to Weimer and Vining, the effectiveness of regulatory intervention can be 
measured against market efficiency: 
“Markets offer the potential for efficiently allocating goods.  Markets, 
therefore, provide the yardsticks against which to measure the efficiency 
of government interventions.”71  
 
On the other hand, government regulation of a market that operates efficiently on 
its own can bring “significant efficiency losses.”72  Public policies are capable of doing 
more harm than good.  Yukio Adachi writes the following on inefficient public policies: 
“‘Government failures,’ or inefficient public policies, can be classified 
broadly into two groups: those whose faults fall on the supply side and 
those that are imperfect on the demand side.  The former are further 
divided into X-inefficiencies and those deriving from the failure to 
adequately perceive the actual policy benefits or costs.  The latter result 
when policy demands are either inflated or lower than the socially optimal 
level.”73   
 
Aggregate policy demand that is either too great or too small to correctly reflect 
societal benefits accruing from a policy will also result in inefficiencies.74  The principal 
types of demand-side inefficiencies are distortions due to externalities or information 
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asymmetries and incorrect reflection of marginal social benefits. 75  Weimer and Vining 
state the following in regards to the possibility of reducing regulatory action: 
“Freeing regulated markets should be considered in those situations in 
which an effective market can be expected to re-emerge with relatively 
minor efficiency distortions – in other words, where there is no inherent 
market failure.”76 
3.2. MARKET FAILURE 
Public authorities regulate capital markets in the belief that the absence of such 
regulation increases the chances of market failure (with its inevitable negative social 
effects).  Market failure is a “circumstance in which the pursuit of private interest does 
not lead to an efficient use of society’s resources or a fair distribution of society’s 
goods.”77  Market failures bring inefficiency to production and consumption patterns of a 
society.78  Interventions to correct market failure must not inflict greater costs than 
benefits.79  Four traditional market failures are: 
1) Public Goods.  According to David Weimer and Aidan Vining, public 
goods are “non-rivalrous in consumption, non-excludable in use, or both.”80   
2) Externalities.  “An externality is any valued impact (positive or negative) 
resulting from any action (whether related to production or consumption) that 
affects someone who did not fully consent to it through participation in voluntary 
exchange.”81 
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3) Natural Monopoly.  The absence of competition in an industry can have 
negative effects on society as a whole. 
4) Information Asymmetry.  Information asymmetry can cause market failure 
“when the producer does not supply the amount of information that maximizes the 
difference between the reduction in deadweight loss and the cost of providing the 
information.”82   
These four market failures “represent violations of the ideal competitive model.”83  
Market failure, or the possibility of market failure, thus prompts public authorities to 
intervene in the market through the implementation of public policies.  There are two   
“broad classes of rationales for public policies: the correction of market failures to 
improve efficiency in the production and allocation of resources and goods, and the 
reallocation opportunity and goods to achieve distributional and other values.”84  The two 
market failures generally used to justify government intervention in capital markets are 
information asymmetry and natural monopolies.   
3.2.1. Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is present in capital markets because corporate insiders 
and managers have greater access to knowledge than clients who purchase securities.  In 
spite of recent efforts (by investors’ associations, regulatory agencies, etc.) to reduce 
information asymmetry in financial markets, this market failure remains pervasive.  
Furthermore, it is not greatly affected by technological advances: professionals who deal 
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in securities will generally know more about their products than clients.  The ability of 
potential information asymmetry to cause market inefficiency “depends largely on 
whether public goods problems hinder the operation of secondary market mechanisms 
that provide corrective information.”85  A combination of information asymmetry in 
primary markets with public good problems in secondary markets has a high likelihood 
of causing market inefficiencies.86 
3.2.2. Natural Monopoly 
 Natural monopolies arise when a single firm can produce a good at a lower cost 
than any other competitor.87  This circumstance leads the monopolist to maximize its 
profits at a level of output that is not consistent with economic efficiency.  Economic 
efficiency requires an output level of a good in which the price of this good equals its 
marginal cost.88  By contrast, the monopolist maximizes profits by producing goods at an 
output level in which marginal revenue equals marginal cost.89  Profit maximization by 
the monopolist results in overall economic “underproduction” – the economy functions at 
less than full capacity.90  Underproduction results in artificially high prices (assuming 
demand is fixed), another economic limitation (for consumers, in this case).  Moreover, 
“natural monopolies do not face as strong incentives as competitive firms to operate at 
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minimum cost.”91  The entire process described above results from the monopolist’s 
ability to set prices (a direct consequence of the absence of competition). 
Natural monopoly can be more easily affected than information asymmetry by 
technological change.92  Financial de-regulation and improved communications are 
moving us into a global securities market.  This development can break down regional 
monopolies.  Nevertheless, some natural monopolies remain.  One example is stock 
exchanges.  Their monopoly over securities trading in a particular geographical area is 
what causes governments to regulate them.   
3.2.3. Addressing Market Failure 
There is no consensus, from a regulatory perspective, on how to address market 
failure.  John Coffee argues that a “mandatory disclosure” system is the answer.  
“Empirical data suggest that a mandatory disclosure system reduces price dispersion and 
enhances the allocation efficiency of capital markets.”93  On the other hand, Neil 
Campbell believes additional regulation is not the answer to market failure.  “The 
practical problem is how to determine the appropriate degree of regulatory intervention to 
cure market failure when costs and benefits are not readily measurable.”94  Larry Ribstein 
also believes that “market-based” approaches are more likely than regulatory action to 
enhance market efficiency.95  Investors, according to Ribstein, will naturally avoid 
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investing in firms that are inefficient.  Markets naturally develop devices (e.g., hostile 
takeovers or incentive compensation schemes for managers) to overcome regulatory 
problems.96  
3.3. OBJECTIVES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
The securities market has two principal goals: (1) to allow the raising of capital 
and (2) to allow the continuing valuation of securities.97  The overall goal of securities 
regulation is to balance investor protection with market efficiency.98  George Goulet lists 
the efficient allocation of capital, the protection of fairness and liquidity, investor 
protection, and the promotion of trust in the market among the main objectives of 
securities regulation.99  Public policy determines how capital markets are regulated. 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory agencies must advance the interests of society as a whole.  Thus, 
securities regulation is an activity that pursues public policy goals.  Regulators must 
tackle, through public policy initiatives, market failure in the financial services industry.  
Greater efficiency and fairness in financial markets can result in increased prosperity for 
a society’s entire economy.   
There is a clear link between public policy and regulatory policy.  This chapter 
has analyzed regulatory policy using the concept of public policy as a theoretical context.  
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Chapter 4 will study the effect an institutional context (federalism) can have on 
regulation and public policy.   
 30 
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF FEDERALISM 
This chapter analyzes effect of federalism on regulatory policy.  First, it offers a 
definition of federalism.  Second, it studies the impact of regionalism on policy-making.  
Third, it analyzes the decentralization of policy-making in federal states.  Fourth, this 
chapter contrasts the structural characteristics of Australia and Canada.  Finally, Chapter 
4 touches on the possible effects of globalization on federal states.   
4.1. DEFINITION OF FEDERALISM  
Federalism is a system of government in which national authorities and regional 
authorities share political power.  This often implies that central authorities, on one hand, 
and local authorities, on the other, have exclusive jurisdiction over distinct areas of 
policy-making.  The degree to which power is divided between central and local 
authorities varies from country to country.  In many cases, there is considerable overlap 
between the jurisdiction of national and regional authorities.  George Goulet defines a 
federal state as “an association of formal communities of the peoples of several distinct 
geographical regions forming a polity consisting of a national union of the regions 
coupled with the preservation of agreed regional rights…”100 
The distinctive features of a classic federation are: 101 
1) Division of powers.  The exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power is clearly separated.  However, in parliamentary democracies such as 
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Australia and Canada, the cabinet often plays a leading role in exercising both 
executive and legislative power. 
2) Supremacy of the constitution.  A constitution provides guidelines through 
which jurisdictional authority and political power are allocated.   
3) Presence of an independent supreme court as final arbiter of the 
constitution and of the constitutional validity of laws.  An independent supreme 
court should be able to render decisions, on constitutional matters, free from 
political interference. 
4.2. REGIONALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING 
One key difference between federal and unitary states is the role played by 
regionalism.  In federal states, “balkanization [of the public policy process] will occur to 
a greater extent along regional lines, because regionally concentrated interest groups will 
be stronger in federal systems.”102  Federalism thus magnifies the regional dimension of 
entry [into the policy-making process] barriers.103  In any event, policy makers in both 
centralized and federal states must take into account new social and economic trends.  
International factors are exerting increasing influence on the domestic policy-making 
process of sovereign states.  The influence of international market reactions, the role of 
international institutions, and so forth, are placing growing constraints on the policy 
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autonomy – economic and social – of national and state [or regional] level 
governments.”104  
4.3. DECENTRALIZATION OF POLICY-MAKING 
The nature of federalism renders policy-making in a federalist system very 
different from policy-making in a unitary state.  Federalism brings a high degree of 
decentralization to political systems.  The formulation of public policies in federalist 
systems must take this into account.  “The objective of a federation is to balance the 
diverse and distinctive regional interests and identities with the greater political and 
economic advantages derived from the union of the various regions.”105 
The decentralization of policy-making can bring a number of important benefits: 
the presence of checks and balances on policy makers; greater ease in matching the 
production of goods to local preferences; the ability of citizens to express their opinions 
on public goods and public policies; the ability of citizens to move to jurisdictions in 
which more efficient policies are in place.106 
The decentralization of public policy-making can also have negative side effects: 
greater complexity; greater difficulties in implementing policies; the effectiveness of 
policies can be limited; and fiscal externalities can occur in association with the supply of 
local public goods.107  Fiscal externalities come about when, for instance, two 
                                                 
104 Cliff Walsh, 1996, “The Challenges of Globalization: Lessons from Australian Experience.”  Paul 
Boothe, Ed., Reforming Fiscal Federalism for Global Competition, p. 23. 
105 George Goulet, 1991, A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Aspects of Securities Regulation in 
Canada and Australia, p. 41. 
106 David Weimer and Aidan Vining, 1998, Policy Analysis, p. 191. 
107 Ibid., p. 191. 
 33 
jurisdictions keep lowering their regulatory standards in order to compete to attract new 
industries.108 
4.4. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES 
Australia and Canada are both federalist states under the same constitutional 
monarchy.  In each country, regional political bodies (the states in Australia, the 
provinces in Canada) wield considerable power with respect to the central government.  
In fact, in each country regional authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over various key 
areas of policy-making.  Both countries also share in common the supremacy of written 
constitutions and the role played by a Supreme Court.  On the other hand, the approaches 
to constitutional interpretation and in the distribution of powers are different in each 
nation.109 
Australia and Canada can, at first sight, lend themselves to a seemingly easy 
comparison due to their considerable similarities.  Both countries are former British 
colonies and members of the Commonwealth of Nations (whose head is the British 
monarch).  Both countries are federal constitutional monarchies with a large land mass 
and low population density.  Both countries have small economies and abundant natural 
resources.  Both countries are home to a relatively large aboriginal population.110  In spite 
of these apparent similarities, there are a number of key differences between the two 
countries: 
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1) Canada must live with a superpower by its side (we might say that 
Australia plays the role of superpower vis-à-vis New Zealand). 
2) Canada must deal with a strong separatist movement, based largely on 
cultural and linguistic identity, in Quebec. 
3) Australia’s Senate, representing the states’ interests, is much more 
powerful than Canada’s. 
4) Regional disparities are roughly four times as large in Canada as in 
Australia. 
5) Canada’s federal transfer payments system targets poor areas to a greater 
extent than Australia’s.  Wages and equalization payments are more consistent 
across regions in Australia.  The federal government delivers social expenditure 
more uniformly across regions in Australia than in Canada. 
6) Economic activity “is distributed more equally across Australian economic 
space” than across Canada’s.  “… Canadian provinces have much more own-
source-revenue fiscal room than Australian states…”  The internal economic 
union of Canada is more fragmented than Australia’s.111 
7) The size of cities is more equally distributed across Australia than Canada: 
five out of six Australian states have an urban conglomerate of at least one million 
people.  
8) Canadian provinces have much greater ability to legislate freely in a 
number of areas than do Australian states.  “One result of this is that there is much 
more leeway for the provinces to fragment the internal common market.” 
                                                 
111 Thomas Courchene, 1996, “Preserving and Promoting the Internal Economic Union.”  Paul Boothe, Ed., 
Reforming Fiscal Federalism for Global Competition, pp. 217-218. 
 35 
9) Regional or provincial considerations influence federal public policy 
debates much more in Canada than in Australia.  This is a result of the fact that 
the federal Senate and equity in federal transfer payments “automatically” provide 
representation to regional concerns in Australia.  No such intrinsic equity or 
representation exists in the Canadian federal policy-making process. 
10) Trends in the development of Australian federalism are distinct from 
Canada’s.  “In lieu of Canadian-style decentralization, the Commonwealth 
government is instead bringing the states more into decision-making at the 
centre.”112  
To summarize these differences, Australia is not undergoing Canadian-style 
decentralization.113  The greater equality among its regions and the greater strength of its 
central government provide checks to decentralizing tendencies. 
4.5. FEDERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 
The differences enumerated above ensure that Canada and Australia respond in 
different ways to the phenomenon of “globalization.”  Canada seems to be 
accommodating increased globalization through decentralization, giving provinces 
considerable leeway to pursue their international interests.  The challenge for Canadian 
policy-makers will be to maintain Canada’s internal “social union.”114  On the other hand, 
increasing globalization may place Australia’s social union in jeopardy.  A trend toward 
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growing centralization may be an “obstacle” for states trying to integrate with each other.  
This trend may also make it difficult for states to compete internationally.115 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has defined the concept of federalism.  This chapter has also studied 
the effects a federal institutional structure can have on policy-making.  I have noted that 
similar federalist systems can have a different impact on two countries with different 
social, economic, and demographic characteristics.  Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will proceed 
to examine in detail the case studies I use to provide evidence to this project’s 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 5: AUSTRALIA 
Australia’s experience in the field of securities regulation provides evidence to 
support this project’s hypothesis that a regulatory framework must adapt to other existing 
institutions.  Australia’s institutional context facilitated the centralization of securities 
regulation in 1989-1991 (when a national securities regulator was created).  This chapter 
will first review the background to Australia’s recent initiatives in the area of securities 
regulation.  Second, it will look at jurisdictional issues in capital markets regulation.  
Third, this chapter will analyze the effects of federalism on Australia’s policy-making 
process.  Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the broader implications of Australia’s experience.  
5.1. BACKGROUND 
Australia’s constitution is federal.  Still, the Commonwealth116 (i.e., national or 
central) government in Canberra retains considerable capacity to challenge state (i.e., 
“provincial”) governments on a variety of issues.  The Commonwealth is able to 
implement policies in the face of state-level opposition.  This fact played an instrumental 
role in the establishment of a single national securities regulatory agency in Australia.  
The Commonwealth government has retained considerable power vis-à-vis state 
governments due to the following factors: the design of the Australian Constitution; the 
role played by the Australian High Court; the relative equality and homogeneity of the 
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different state governments; and the assumptions and traditions embedded in the 
Australian body politic. 
Figure 1: Change in Australia’s Securities Regulation Framework 
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5.1.1. Financial Scandals in the 1980s 
The creation of a national securities regulator in 1989-1991 must be seen in the 
context of the 1980s boom and subsequent bust.  This bust saw the collapse of large 
media, brewing and industrial firms, and major banks.117  Investors excoriated “corporate 
cowboys.”  These “cowboys” had artificially driven up the prices of businesses, 
properties, and equities.118  The state-level corporate affairs commissions were starved of 
resources and could not cope with the simultaneous scandals.119  The scandals and 
prosecutions of the late 1980s prompted the Commonwealth government to intervene, 
through legislation, in the regulation of capital markets.  This attempt failed “because the 
High Court120 ruled that the power to legislate for trading and financial corporations did 
not extend to the power to incorporate them.”121   
5.1.2. Efforts to Centralize Securities Regulation 
The High Court’s action led to a “deal” between the six states, the Northern 
Territory and the national government.  Under this agreement, the Commonwealth 
“effectively bought corporate regulation from the states and that territory…”122 The 
Commonwealth enacted a company law for the Australian Capital Territory through its 
plenary power to legislate for territories.  This law would serve as a legislative base that 
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could be adopted by the other seven regional authorities.123  Agreements reached between 
the Commonwealth government and the states throughout 1990 required identical 
legislation to be passed in each of the seven state parliaments (the state government of 
Western Australia was the most reluctant to relinquish its regulatory powers).  124  
Through these agreements, the states were “effectively bought out of the business of 
regulating companies and markets.”125  The federal authorities would take over the job of 
regulation, but the states would continue to receive the income they had gathered through 
regulatory activities (through fees, fines, etc.).126  
The reform efforts Australia has gone through include the following:127 
1) Uniform legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.   
2) Draft federal legislation in 1974 that was never passed. 
3) Multilateral agreements among states and territories in place of federal 
legislation.  This represented an attempt to achieve direct coordination between 
the states, “by-passing” the Commonwealth government. 
4) State and territory incorporation by reference of federal legislation in 
1978.  This initiative failed inefficiency, instability, and a lack of ministerial 
accountability.  The threats of regional authorities to withdraw produced a “lowest 
common denominator”–type regulation.  
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5) In the late 1980s, the Commonwealth government took a leading role in 
the drive to reform securities regulation.  The national government exercised the 
political will necessary to corral state authorities into acquiescing to reforms. 
6) In 1988, local stock exchanges in Australia merged.  This represented an 
important step toward financial rationalization.  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission was initially established 
through federal legislation, without state involvement.  This proved to be unconstitutional 
in certain respects.  The regulatory system established in 1989-1991 is based on federal 
legislation that the states apply as their own legislation.128  Australia thus successfully 
completed the transition of moving from a state-based regulatory system to a centralized 
system. 
5.2. REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS  
Capital formation has played an increasingly important role in Australia’s 
economic life.  “Within a decade from its wartime nadir of a mere 5 per cent of GDP, 
capital formation had risen above 25 per cent of that measure…”129 Capital formation 
remained at around that figure until 1990.130 
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5.2.1. State Jurisdiction 
States have traditionally held jurisdiction over corporate law and securities 
regulation.131  The reform of Australia’s securities regulation system has taken place in a 
“staged fashion.”  Business dissatisfaction with the costs associated with fragmented 
regulation led the states to seek improvement to the existing system.  “In the 1960s, [the 
states] passed uniform legislation that eventually diverged again as individual 
jurisdictions reacted individually to events.”132  Prompted by various financial scandals, a 
Senate Committee recommended the creation of a national securities commission in 
1970.133  “In 1978, a three-tiered scheme was enacted that had the states enact federal 
legislation by reference…”134 This scheme created a federal body, the National 
Companies and Securities Commission, in addition to existing state Corporate Affairs 
Commissions.  “This approach provided uniform legislation but fragmented 
administration and enforcement.”135  The three-tiered system proved to be inadequate.136 
5.2.2. Commonwealth Jurisdiction 
Section 51 of the Australian Constitution appears to provide enough scope for the 
Commonwealth to forge a uniform approach to company law.  Section 51 states the 
Parliament has the power to make laws “for the peace, order and good government of the 
                                                 
131 Canadian Bankers Association, 2003, Proposals for an Efficient and Effective Regulatory System in 
Canada, p. 10. 
132 Ibid., p. 10. 
133 Ibid., p. 10. 
134 Ibid., p. 10. 
135 Ibid., pp 10-11. 
136 Ibid., p. 11. 
 43 
Commonwealth.”137  The Commonwealth Parliament holds this power “with respect to 
… foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of 
the Commonwealth.”138  However, through the Corporations Case (1990), the High 
Court established that legislation relating to the formation of corporations is to be 
regarded as a state matter.  The Court held that section 51 only empowers the 
Commonwealth to legislate in terms of already “formed” companies.139  Each state has 
the power to incorporate corporations.140 
Both the Commonwealth and the states are able to play a role in the regulation of 
corporations.  The States have the authority to regulate the affairs of state corporations.  
The Commonwealth can regulate the affairs of state corporations that are characterized as 
trading or financial corporations.  The Commonwealth may also regulate corporations 
that are formed under specific Commonwealth powers.  Finally, the Commonwealth can 
regulate the activities of foreign corporations in Australia.  However, the 
Commonwealth’s authority to regulate does not extend to internal affairs of state 
corporations (e.g., their powers, capacities and internal regulations).141 
5.2.3. The Alice Springs Agreement 
The so-called Alice Springs Agreement in 1990, aided in large part by financial 
scandals in a number of states, effectively “federalized” company law.  Under this 
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agreement, federal law would no longer apply to the states – the text of the 
Commonwealth law would be adopted by each of the states and the Northern Territory 
and enacted as their own legislation or law.142  
5.2.4. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is the national 
agency tasked with regulating the Australian securities industry.  The ASIC is an 
independent Commonwealth body.  The Governor-General appoints the ASIC’s 
Commissioners on the nomination of the Treasurer.  The ASIC is accountable to the 
Commonwealth Parliament, to the Treasurer, and to the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasurer.143  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 
established the ASIC.  It began to function on January 1, 1991.  The ASIC took over the 
functions previously performed by the National Companies and Securities Commissions 
(NCSC) and the Corporate Affairs offices of the [individual] States and Territories.”144 
The main functions of the ASIC are: registration of companies; registration of 
company auditors and liquidators; processing and distributing information to the public 
about securities schemes; exercising statutory discretion to relieve companies from 
compliance with provisions of the Corporations Law; regulating the securities industry; 
regulating the futures industry; investigating suspected contraventions of the 
Corporations Law; enforcing compliance with the Corporations Law; and enforcing and 
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investigating suspected contraventions of consumer protection provisions.145  “The 
powers of the [ASIC] are complemented in many ways by the powers of the Exchange 
(ASX) with respect to listed companies and other securities interests.”146 
Some critics posit that the ASIC’s powers “involve an unwarranted interventionist 
stance in relation to the regulation of the corporate market sphere.”  Opponents of this 
view believe that the ASIC needs broad powers to protect the public.147  Some 
commentators believe that regulation promotes investor confidence and encourages 
market investment.  Other commentators believe that too much market regulation reduces 
the market’s dynamism.148 
In 1998 Australian authorities broadened the jurisdictional scope of the ASIC in 
order to cover the regulation of market conduct for banking, insurance, and pension 
sectors.149  “In June 2001, the Australian parliament passed into law the Corporations 
Act, 2001, designed to place Australia’s system of corporate regulation on a secure 
constitutional foundation.”150 
5.3. FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY  
Bicameralism in the central government and divided jurisdiction (between the 
Commonwealth and state governments) are two principal characteristics of the 
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institutions that determine public policy in Australia.151  According to the Australian 
Constitution, Commonwealth powers are largely concurrent with the states’.  The states 
generally hold any residual powers.152 “However, in those areas where the 
Commonwealth does have concurrent powers, its legislation ultimately is 
paramount…”153 The Commonwealth also has a grant power, under section 96 of the 
Constitution, “which enables it to enter into the fields that are exclusively those of the 
states…”154 The Commonwealth can do this by setting conditions on its provision of 
financial support for State activities in said fields.155   
5.3.1. Increase in the Commonwealth’s Power 
Recent years have seen an increase in the power of the Commonwealth vis-à-vis 
the states in the field of public policy-making.  This is a result of various factors.  First, 
political authorities have used clauses in the Australian Constitution to advance the 
federalist cause.  Second, the High Court has reached decisions in favour of expanding 
Commonwealth powers.  Third, the Commonwealth exerts control over finances and 
economic resources.  Fourth, the political make-up of recent federal governments has 
aided the expansion of Commonwealth powers. 
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5.3.2. The Role of the Right and the Left 
Conservative or “right-wing” social groups in Australia have generally favoured 
federalism as an instrument that can protect regional interests against national majorities.  
Federalism “helps insulate markets from interventionism and society from social 
engineering.”156  In contrast, left-wing groups in Australia have traditionally been 
centralists.  They seek to minimize or eliminate the obstacles federalism places in the 
way of nation-wide reformist policy-making.157  The ascendancy of the Labour Party in 
the 1980s and early 1990s provided political and ideological support to the movement to 
centralize the regulation of the securities industry. 
5.3.3. Economic Rationalism 
The general trend we can observe in the approach of Australian policy-makers to 
the financial sector represents a shift from “draconian” regulation to de-regulation.158  
Australia’s stock exchanges, founded in the late 19th century, were initially self-
regulated.  “This process of self-regulation was overwhelmed during the speculative 
boom in mining stocks in the late 1960s.”159  Wide speculation led to number of scandals.  
These scandals caused the government to launch an investigation into the securities 
industry.  The recommendations of a government report submitted in 1974 led to the 
establishment of an Australian Companies and Securities Commission.  This Commission 
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would henceforth regulate the stock exchanges, thus ending the exchanges’ self-
regulation.160 
The drive toward economic “rationalism” has played a prominent role in recent 
public policy debates in Australia.161  The centralization of securities regulation (among 
other policy initiatives) must be seen in this context.  Economic rationalism has raised the 
profile of public policy in Australia.  Economic rationalism has also re-invigorated 
debates about the role of government.”162 
5.3.4. The Constitution and Commonwealth Supremacy 
While Australia is a federation in which the states enjoy large degrees of 
autonomy, the Australian Constitution provides some support to notions of 
Commonwealth supremacy over the states.  Section 109 declares that in the event of a 
clash between State and Commonwealth legislation, “the latter shall prevail.”163  Under 
section 51, the Commonwealth has extensive powers over taxation and the supply and 
borrowing of money.  However, the Commonwealth’s authority over other areas is 
ambiguous.  There is contention over the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction over business 
regulation and control.164 
5.3.5. Interventions of the High Court in Jurisdictional Conflicts 
The High Court of Australia is an important player in public policy debates due to 
its role as an arbiter in Commonwealth-State jurisdictional conflicts.  Since, the early 
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1970, High Court decisions have helped the cause of policy-making centralization.  The 
Court’s decisions have allowed an expansion of the Commonwealth’s policy-making 
abilities.165  High Court decisions have extended federal powers over the regulation of 
anti-competitive business practices, human rights legislation, and environmental heritage 
preservation.166  Judicial action has thus contributed to a shift away from what has been 
called “co-operative federalism” and toward Commonwealth dominance.167   
5.3.6. The Commonwealth’s Financial Clout 
The Commonwealth’s power over the purse strings is another reason for which it 
has been able to increase its dominance over public policy-making in Australia.  The 
federal government raises around 80 percent of all government revenue.  Federal 
authorities are only responsible for 50 percent of government spending.168  A series of 
Commonwealth-State agreements (e.g., on company law) have enhanced the internal 
economic union of Australia.  Inter-state agreements (e.g., on mutual recognition) have 
complemented Commonwealth-State agreements.169 
5.3.7. Hawke’s New Federalism 
Federal and state political parties are linked (e.g., the state Labour parties are 
joined to the federal Labour party).  Some resistance to new federal policies can come 
from the regional branches of federal parties.  Such resistance is due to the possible local 
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impact of national policies.170  Prime Minister Bob Hawke (1983-1991) attempted to re-
invigorate Australian federalism.  He established a framework through which the federal 
and state governments could jointly formulate new policy initiatives.  Through Hawke’s 
New Federalism, regional and federal authorities tackled a number of regulatory regimes 
where differences existed between the states.  Policy makers made substantial progress in 
achieving a greater degree of consistency, though not necessarily uniformity, between the 
states.171   
The Hawke New Federalism allowed the states to “rediscover” their role within 
the federation.  State policy makers realized how powerful they could be if they 
coordinated their actions.  Hawke’s successor as Prime Minister, Paul Keating (1991-
1996), attempted to re-establish Commonwealth dominance over the policy-making 
process.  He was, however, unable to shut out the states from the federal policy-making 
process.  The consultative framework established by Hawke could not be dismantled.172 
5.4. IMPLICATIONS OF AUSTRLIA’S EXPERIENCE 
In my view, Australia’s experience in the field of securities regulation shows that 
any reform of the framework of securities regulation must “fit” broader institutional 
trends.  The centralization of securities regulation in 1989-1991 would not have been 
possible without a number of broader institutional developments in Australian society.  
These developments included: the growing power of the Commonwealth with respect to 
the states (admittedly based on strong constitutional and judicial foundations); the 
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electoral successes of the Labour Party, a party favourable to the strengthening of the 
Commonwealth’s policy-making prerogatives; and the relative equality, in terms of 
political and economic weight, of the different states.  The creation of the ASIC might 
not have been possible without the simultaneous confluence of these institutional trends.  
The common denominator of these trends is their tendency to strengthen the role of the 
Commonwealth in any policy dispute with the states.  
The Australian authorities working to centralize securities regulation had the 
political will to see their regulatory reforms through, in spite of constitutional challenges 
to these reforms.173  “The Australian experience also provides a working example of how 
a delegation model can be used to create a single national securities commission without 
entering the realm of constitutional reform.”174   
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CHAPTER 6: CANADA 
Canada’s experience in the field of securities regulation provides evidence to 
support this project’s conclusions.  Canada’s institutional context and regional 
imbalances cause Canadian securities regulation to remain decentralized.  This chapter 
will first review the background to Canada’s recent initiatives in the area of securities 
regulation.  Second, it looks at jurisdictional issues in capital markets regulation.  Third, 
this chapter analyzes the effects of federalism on Canada’s policy-making process.  
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the implications of Canada’s experience.  
6.1. BACKGROUND 
Canadian political institutions place great emphasis on the power and autonomy 
of provincial governments.  The Canadian federal government is much weaker, with 
respect to its respective regional authorities, than the Australian Commonwealth 
government.  Canada’s Constitution, political history, and domestic balance of power 
make it is extremely difficult for the federal government to appropriate powers presently 
belonging to provincial governments.  This is one of the reasons for which it has been 
impossible to establish a single national securities regulatory agency in Canada.  The 
authority to regulate capital markets remains in the hands of provincial governments.   
6.1.1. Attempts to Reform Securities Regulation 
There have been several attempts to create a national securities authority.  In 
1977, a federal proposal to create such an agency was dropped due to insufficient 
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support.  In the mid-1990s, provincial concerns over the loss of revenues (from filing and 
registration fees) provoked the breakdown of negotiations to create a national securities 
Figure 2: Change in Canada’s Securities Regulation Framework 
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authority.175  Other reform initiatives include: the Porter Report (1964), the CANSEC 
Proposal (1967), the Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada study (1979), and 
the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding and its revival in 1996.176  
6.1.2. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 
In order to coordinate their actions, policy proposals, and legislation, Canada’s 
provincial securities regulators have formed the Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA).  The CSA is an association formed by provincial securities regulators through 
which regulatory agencies meet “to discuss matters of mutual concern and policy and 
which has an objective of compatibility or harmony of provincial securities 
regulation.”177 
6.1.3. Recent Federal and Provincial Initiatives  
In 2002-2003, the federal government created a “Wise Persons” Committee in 
order to study the future direction of securities regulation in Canada.  Provincial ministers 
established the Steering Committee of Ministers for the same purpose.178  A number of 
important players in the Canadian securities industry have continued to lobby for the 
creation of a single national securities regulatory agency in Canada.  Most provincial 
authorities, with the key exception of Ontario, are sceptical of the creation of a national 
regulatory agency.  An alternative to such a creation is the establishment of a “passport” 
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system that will allow investment firms licensed in one province to automatically receive 
authorization to conduct operations in all other provinces.  This “passport” system has 
received considerable support.  The following are some critical elements in the debate 
over the form Canada’s securities regulation structure should take: 179 
1) The role of regional interests.  The decentralized nature of the Canadian 
federation requires that any reform take into account regional interests.  It would 
be exceedingly difficult to implement initiatives that are not accepted by 
provincial authorities.  
2) Costs associated with the current structure.  These costs must be measured 
against the costs that might be incurred by the creation of an alternative regulatory 
system, such a single national securities regulator. 
3) Benefits/Risks associated with regulatory competition.  The present 
framework of securities regulation provides for regulatory competition among the 
various agencies.  On one hand, this can encourage regulatory creativity.  On the 
other hand, it might lead to a “race to the bottom” between the different agencies. 
4)  Analysis of the experience of other countries or jurisdictions.  Canada can 
learn from the experiences of foreign jurisdictions with federal of quasi-federal 
systems of government (e.g., Australia or the European Union). 
6.1.4. Federal Legislation and Capital Markets 
While securities regulation remains in provincial hands, some current federal 
legislation plays a role in the oversight of capital markets.  Legislation such as the 
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Canadian Business Corporations Act, the Bank Act, the Investment Canada Act, and the 
Criminal Code of Canada must be taken into account in the field of securities trading.180  
“Securities legislation in Canada is an amalgam of two philosophies, mandatory 
disclosure and merit regulation.”181 
6.1.5. Stock Exchange Amalgamation 
Canada’s stock exchanges recently went through an amalgamation process.  Ten 
years ago, there were a number of equity exchanges in existence: Toronto, Montreal, 
Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, etc.  The only equity exchange today is the TSX, with 
the TSX Venture Exchange as its subsidiary.  The Montreal Exchange is responsible for 
derivatives trading.182 
6.2. REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
Canada “is surely unique among federations in that the securities industry is 
almost entirely provincially regulated.”183  Provincial securities commissions control the 
regulatory apparatus, including the accreditation of brokers.184  Stock exchanges, on the 
other hand, have undergone much consolidation in recent years.  In spite of its balkanized 
regulatory system, Canada has a “very effective” capital market for a country of its size.  
This is, in part, the result of a considerable degree of harmonization among the different 
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securities commissions.185  One possible explanation is that the absence of a federal role 
forced the provinces to build a national capital market. 
6.2.1. The Constitution and Provincial Jurisdiction 
The Canadian Constitution establishes clearly that the provinces have authority to 
legislate securities law.  This authority was re-affirmed by the Privy Council in 1932.186  
A Privy Council decision in that year stated that provinces have the constitutional 
authority to regulate securities markets through their ability to make laws in relation to 
“property and civil rights in [a] province.”187  “Additional authority to regulate securities 
markets derives from the provinces’ ability to incorporate companies with ‘provincial 
objects,’ but only insofar as the regulation is ancillary to company law objectives.”188 
Section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Canadian provinces 
jurisdiction over “property and civil rights in the province.”  This authority “is limited by 
the territorial boundaries of the province.”189  The federal government’s constitutional 
ability to regulate securities markets is less clear.190  Some possible 
constitutional/legislative bases for the exercise of federal power in this arena are: 191 (1) 
the Peace Order and Good Government of Canada; (2) the Regulation of Trade and 
Commerce; (3) Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money; (4) 
Savings Banks; (5) the Criminal Law; and (6) Federal works and undertakings. 
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6.2.2. The Constitution and Federal Jurisdiction 
The Constitutional appears to grant the federal government at least a limited role 
in the regulation of capital markets.  We can find the basis of federal competence in the 
field of securities regulation in the federal Parliament’s powers under the Constitution 
Act, 1867.  These powers include primarily the power to make laws in relation to trade 
and commerce (section 91 (2)), the power to make laws in relation to inter-provincial 
works and undertakings (sections 92 (10) (a) with 91 (29)) and the power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of Canada (found in the lead-in words to 
section 91).192 
The federal government can also “indirectly” play a role in securities regulation 
through its jurisdiction over national and international trade.  “The Parliament’s powers 
with respect to inter-provincial and international trade and commerce give it competence 
over inter-provincial and international securities regulation.”193 
The “Wise Persons” Committee (WPC) established by the federal minister of 
finance to review the structure of securities regulation in Canada proposed the 
establishment of a single national securities regulatory agency in its final report 
(December 2003).  The model proposed by the WPC would take into account the 
Uniform Securities Legislation Project undertaken by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators.194  A number of studies included in the WPC’s report argue that the 
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federal government has the constitutional ability to centralize securities regulation in 
Canada.  In a Constitutional Opinion presented to the WPC, Ogilvy Renault writes: 
“In our view, Parliament has the constitutional power to enact the Act 
[establishing a single national securities regulator].  The general branch of 
the federal trade and commerce power under section 91 (2) of The 
Constitution Act, 1867 … provides Parliament with the strongest basis for 
enacting the Act.”195 
 
Allan McEachern (of Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP), in an Opinion offered to 
the same committee, essentially agrees, explaining: 
 
“In summary, it is my opinion that Parliament has the legislative authority 
to enact legislation implementing the CSC model [of a national securities 
regulator].  Further, the provinces and territories have legislative authority 
to enact legislation that incorporates federal securities legislation by 
reference, delegates administrative powers to the CSC and dissolves the 
existing provincial and territorial securities regulatory bodies.196 
6.2.3. Arguments for Centralizing Securities Regulation 
One of the arguments advanced in favour of the creation of a national securities 
regulator is the belief that this initiative would reduce current regulatory costs.  There are 
presently three primary reasons for the high costs of securities regulation in Canada: (i) 
differences among the various jurisdictions, (ii) the presence of multiple decision-makers, 
and (iii) the complexity of regulation. 
6.2.4. Initiatives to Increase the Efficiency of Securities Regulation 
The existing regulatory bodies in Canada have taken steps to make the securities 
regulation framework more efficient: 197 
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1) The design of National Instruments.  These represent an attempt to reduce 
the differences between regulatory jurisdictions. 
2) Efforts have been made to create a Uniform Securities Law.  This initiative 
might eliminate legislative differences between jurisdictions.  
3) The creation of a mutual reliance system.  This allows provinces and 
territories to “rely on a lead jurisdiction to process prospectuses and related 
material.” 
4) Regional regulatory agencies can use standard electronic filing systems 
(e.g., SEDAR, SEDI).  This initiative can help harmonize the procedures of the 
various provincial regulatory agencies. 
Issuers, registrants, and intermediaries must deal with Self-Regulating 
Organizations (SROs), in addition to regulatory agencies.  Examples of such SROs are 
the Investment Dealers Association (IDA), the Mutual Fund Dealers Association 
(MFDA), the Canadian Investor Protection Fund, and the Market Regulatory Services.198 
6.2.5. Ongoing Debate in Canada over Securities Regulation   
No final decision has yet been taken on the framework of securities regulation in 
Canada.  It seems that debates over this framework arise every few years.  The debate 
may continue well into the future.  Past and present trends indicate, in my view, Canada 
is still struggling to find a regulatory framework that can “fit” into the broader Canadian 
institutional context.  This is made all the more difficult by the fact that Canada’s 
institutional context is itself subject to frequent debate and change. 
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6.3. FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Canada appears to be more decentralized than Australia at a political and 
economic level.  It is much more difficult for Canadian policy-makers to pursue an 
internal economic union.199  On the other hand, Canada’s greater decentralization leaves 
greater scope for what has been dubbed “competitive federalism”: different jurisdiction 
can “experiment” with different public policy systems in order to find out which are most 
efficient200 (presumably the results of policy experimentation and competition could be 
shared). 
6.3.1. The Federalist Character of Canada 
 In contrast to Australia, Canadian courts have not consistently promoted the 
notion of federal primacy.  The relative absence of national cohesion has played a role in 
leaving Canada with a more fragmented “internal economic space” than Australia.201  
The 1867 British North America Act firmly established the federal character of policy-
making in Canada.  The “patriation” of the Constitution in 1982 and the enactment of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the same year re-affirmed this federal character.  
Attempts to reform the Canadian Constitution in 1987-1990, through the “Meech Lake 
Accord,” and in 1992, through the “Charlottetown Accord,” failed.  Nevertheless, the 
proposals put forward during these two negotiation processes revealed the depth of 
Canada’s federalist character: Canadian provinces are jealous of their prerogatives.  
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6.3.2. The Quebec Factor 
The importance of the role played by the “Quebec factor” in structuring the 
Canadian securities regulation framework, and indeed in Canada’s entire economic 
framework, cannot be underestimated.  Quebec’s social, judicial, and economic systems 
are based on traditions that are distinct from the British models implanted in much of the 
rest of Canada.  Since the révolution tranquile in the 1960s and the growth of separatist 
tendencies occurred around the same time, Quebec’s claim to a unique status within the 
Canadian Confederation has grown more shrill and urgent.  It seems unlikely that Quebec 
would ever relinquish the independence of its Commission des valeurs mobilières du 
Québec (Quebec’s own provincial securities commission). 
6.3.3. Ontario’s Preponderance 
The political, demographic, and economic preponderance of Ontario in Canada 
also plays an important role in shaping the debate over securities regulation.  However, 
rather than using its dominance to play a coordinating role, Ontario’s financial 
“hegemony” has actually increased other provinces’ reluctance to join in the creation of a 
national regulatory agency.  Smaller provinces fear that Ontario and its interests would 
dominate such an agency. 
6.3.4. Asymmetric Character of Canadian Federalism 
The protagonism played (for different reasons) by Quebec and Ontario in the 
Canadian federation makes it more difficult for the federal government to introduce 
constitutional innovations.  The “asymmetry” (in terms of power and wealth) between the 
different Canadian provinces easily results in distrust among the various provinces.  At 
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the same time this distrust prevents the federal government from implementing a 
conciliatory or a “divide-and-rule” strategy.  This renders constitutional innovation in 
Canada very difficult.  The reform of the framework for securities regulation would 
require some kind of constitutional change.   
6.4. IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA’S EXPERIENCE 
Canada’s experience in the field of securities regulation shows that any reform of 
the framework of securities regulation must adapt to the broader institutional context.  
Federalist tendencies within Canada’s institutional framework are very strong.  For this 
reason, the current province-based securities regulation system is, to some degree, well 
adapted to the existing institutional framework.  Any reform of securities regulation 
today would require not only that the new regulatory system “fit” the institutional 
context, but also that the process through which reform is achieved “fit” institutional 
requirements (i.e., that all relevant actors be satisfied with the consultative and policy-
making process).  “The Canadian system of securities regulation is the product of 
[Canada’s] history.”202  We might add that the future shape of Canada’s regulatory 
framework will be a product of Canada’s future institutional development. 
6.4.1. What is Required to Reform the Canadian System? 
The absence of an “exogenous event” (e.g., European unification or domestic 
financial scandals) that can help jump-start structural reform of the securities regulation 
system distinguishes reform efforts in Canada from the experience in Australia and the 
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European Union.203  A thorough reform of the Canadian regulatory system would require 
sustained “political and regulatory will” to see changes through – at this time it is not 
clear whether that “will” exists.204 
6.4.2. The Implausibility of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction 
To date, proposals for reform of the regulatory system have not suggested 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over securities regulation.  Most policy makers do not 
consider exclusive federal jurisdiction over securities a realistic option.  Policy makers 
recognize that “the political realities of regulatory reform, as well as the constitutional 
division of powers in Canada” make exclusive federal jurisdiction difficult.205  Moreover, 
we must take into account that Quebec would never participate in the creation of a 
national regulator.206  Commentators in Canada, after studying the Australian experience 
in securities regulation, “have recognized the need for a regulator’s activities to be 
grounded in constitutional authority.”207  
6.4.3. Political Obstacles to the Centralization of Securities Regulation 
The following are some of the lingering “political” issues that make the formation 
of a national securities commission difficult: 208 
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1) The loss of power (of smaller provinces) to the “Eastern Establishment.”  
Any reform of securities regulation in Canada must provide re-assurances to 
smaller provinces that their interests will be respected. 
2) The loss of power to Ontario.  Other provinces would be reluctant to join 
any new regulatory scheme that simply increased Ontario’s financial dominance. 
3) The difficulty of altering the existing distribution of power in a federal 
system.  A reform of securities regulation would involve some form of 
constitutional change.   
4) Quebec’s claims.  Strong nationalist sentiment in Quebec makes the 
surrender of any provincial power highly problematic. 
5) Bureaucratic turf wars and the possibility of job cuts.  Turf wars between 
provincial and federal agencies could ensue from a re-distribution of 
responsibility for securities regulation.  The creation of a single national securities 
regulator would likely lead to job cuts at the local level. 
6) Turf battles within the provinces. 
7) A possible “veto” from Ontario.  Ontario hegemony in financial matters 
gives this province an effective “veto” over any initiatives in the area of securities 
regulation. 
8) Federal-Provincial horse-trading.  The need for “consensus” between 
federal and provincial authorities over regulatory change can impose considerable 
challenges to the swift reform of securities regulation. 
 66 
6.4.4. Developments Undermining the Status Quo 
Canada’s relatively lesser degree of economic union [than Australia’s] is a result 
of provincial and federal actions and omissions.209  Current developments may undermine 
the status quo.  For instance, banks, which are federally regulated, have largely taken 
over Canadian securities firms – this development could undercut provincial control over 
regulation.210  “External forces (north-south trade and agreements like the FTA and 
NAFTA) have played a much greater role in freeing up domestic markets in Canada than 
in Australia.”211  In any event, this chapter has shown that Canada will likely cope with 
these changes in a different way than Australia.  Canada’s securities regulation 
framework may change, but it will probably not change in the “Australian” fashion. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYTIC SYNTHESIS 
Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions of this project.  First, it reviews the 
importance of the role played by the institutional framework of capital markets.  Second, 
this chapter touches on the effect of regionalist forces on financial regulation.  Third, it 
reviews the main lessons drawn from the case studies of Australia and Canada.  Finally, 
Chapter 7 emphasizes the main conclusion of this project: namely, the need for a 
regulatory system to “fit” into its institutional surroundings in order to be successful.  
7.1. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
This project has attempted to examine the relationship between capital markets 
and political institutions.  Political institutions establish a framework for the exercise of 
the power of the state in a society.  One of the ways in which the state exercises its power 
is by regulating capital markets.  Capital markets cannot flourish in a society in which the 
power of the state is exercised arbitrarily.  Capital markets in Australia and Canada are 
generally not faced with the arbitrary exercise of state power.  In Australia, capital 
markets are regulated in a highly centralized way.  In Canada, capital markets are 
regulated in a highly decentralized way.   
Regulatory authorities in both countries operate under a number of constraints.  
At the same time, capital markets are compelled to operate within certain regulatory 
requirements.  These requirements play an important role in determining the level of 
 68 
efficiency, the attractiveness, and the cost levels of capital markets.  Regulatory 
intervention by public authorities is designed to prevent or diminish market failure. 
It is difficult to determine the impact the centralization of capital markets 
regulation has had on market failure issues in Australia.  The creation of the ASIC has, in 
theory, rationalized public policies in the field of securities regulation.  ASIC centralizes 
information on securities trading and investment firms.  ASIC should be capable of 
providing information to investors nationwide within a short period of time.  On the other 
hand, ASIC’s expertise on regional financial markets may be less than the expertise of 
the defunct state securities commissions.   
The centralization of securities regulation in Australia represents, in part, an 
attempt to counter the information asymmetry-like effects resulting from the difficulties 
in transferring information from one regional regulatory agency to another.  Future 
results will establish whether regulatory centralization also counters the information 
asymmetry-like effects that result from the difficulty in transferring information from 
regional financial centres to a central regulatory agency. 
It is likewise difficult to hypothesize on how the centralization of securities 
regulation in Canada might affect existing market failures in the securities industry.  One 
of the main weaknesses of the present regulatory system, the lack of coordination among 
provincial agencies, can foster information asymmetry-like effects.  Lack of regulatory 
coordination means that valuable information is often not transferred rapidly from one 
province to another.  However, centralizing securities regulation may simply alter 
information transfer problems, rather than eliminating them.  For instance, a national 
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regulatory agency may solve the issue of province-to-province information sharing, but it 
might have trouble collecting information from provincial financial centres.   
7.2. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
Both Canada and Australia are “characterized by regional segmentation in capital 
markets activity.”212  Douglas Hyndman, Chair of the British Columbia Securities 
Commission, believes that the “regional dimension” of capital markets activity is more 
challenging for Canada than for Australia.213  This is a result of the sharp regional 
contrasts in Canada.  These contrasts are found at a variety of levels: political, economic, 
demographic, etc.  Regional imbalances in Canada represent a serious obstacle to the 
centralization of securities regulation.  Relatively greater regional balance in Australia 
was a key factor that enabled the Australian Commonwealth government to centralize the 
capital markets regulation in 1989-1991.     
7.4. LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
We can draw a number of abstract conclusions from the experiences of Australia 
and Canada: 
(1) The experiences of both Australia and Canada indicate that the way in 
which capital markets are regulated is in many aspects a reflection of a country’s 
“institutional character” and “way of doing things.” 
(2) Any change to the framework of capital markets regulation requires a 
solid constitutional and legal foundation. 
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(3) National (federal) policy makers must have the political will to overcome 
the status quo in order to centralize capital markets regulation. 
(4) The centralization of capital markets requires that regional authorities be 
willing to cede power to the central government. 
(5) Extraordinary events, such as corporate scandals or financial crises, can 
aid attempts to change the status quo.  Such events lend impetus, through public 
opinion, to reformist proposals.  In Australia, financial and corporate scandals in 
the late 1980s gave an added impulse to proposals to reform securities regulation.  
Eventually, reform proposals resulted in the creation of a single national 
regulatory authority.  Hypothetically, the reverse might happen: scandals in a 
country’s financial centre or central government might provide arguments to those 
in favour of keeping capital markets regulation in the hands of regional 
authorities. 
(6) It is difficult to centralize the regulation of capital markets if regional 
authorities oppose such an initiative. 
7.5. THE NEED FOR A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO “FIT” 
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS 
The common denominator running through these six generic conclusions is the 
need a capitalist society has for a securities regulation system that is “in sync” with 
broader institutional conditions.  I believe this lesson can be extended to encompass the 
entire financial system of a society, not just securities regulation.  A financial system can 
thrive only if it is responsive to society’s needs.  A financial system must also be held to 
account with respect to a society’s values.  
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This project has attempted to shed some light on the institutional factors that 
affect how capital markets are regulated.  The case studies of Australia and Canada 
illustrate how a regulatory system must adapt to a broader institutional context.  
Otherwise, a regulatory system will risk becoming ineffective or implausible.  While 
institutional factors are extremely important in the area of capital markets regulation, we 
must not lose sight of the fact that other factors, such as globalization, play important 
roles in shaping the framework of capital markets. 
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